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Introduction
‘Words are deeds.’
– Ludwig Wittgenstein (1984: 46)
How true is this of academic disciplines, which are constructed
through a veritable empire of words – written, reviewed, recited, and
reified? Our response to Benjamin Cohen’s work departs from an
approach that documents disciplinary journeys through its textual
manifestations alone. The text and texture of intellectual disciplines,
in both subtle and profound ways, are constitutive of their context. In
the case of southern Africa, we will argue that political economy as
an intellectual project has shaped both the political and physical
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cartography of the region. After briefly engaging with Cohen’s work
by fingering its silences and divergences, we will undertake a
narrative journey into three distinct phases of political economy in
southern Africa. In the first phase, we argue that the subversion of
politics by economics in the academe resulted in a peculiar rendition
of political economy – a political economy of colonialism – in which
the nature of state and sovereignty were functionally directed. In the
second, the intellectual logics of the Cold War, apartheid South
Africa and modernisation theory worked to enforce the hegemony
of a racial South Africa within the region. Finally, we argue that
while the end of apartheid and the Cold War offered exciting new
possibilities for the region, these were swiftly captured by the
averred TINA (There Is No Alternative) of neo-liberal economics.
The Academic Darwinism
of Benjamin Cohen
Cohen’s recent attempts at writing a history of IPE must, at the
outset, be seen as an epistemic project that aims to establish a body of
ideas and ideologies as the corpus of the discipline. In narrating the
evolution of IPE as an academic discipline, Cohen’s earlier work
(2008) defined the field by dividing it into two streams: an American
and a British school. In response to this taxonomy, Paul Cammack
(2011: 149) has suggested that Cohen’s account should be seen as a
‘construction of IPE as a field rather than a history of how it was
constructed’. He also argues that Cohen has sanitised a particular
rendition of the rise of the IPE, calling this its ‘history’. Urging great
plurality in its history, critics have advanced two distinct lines of
argument. Some, for instance, have argued that Cohen is not
intellectually inclusive in respect of his taxonomy, and neglects the
work of important individuals, thus underestimating the impact of a
broad stream of western Marxist scholars who informed the
development of IPE. Secondly, other critics argue that, by drawing
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on just those two schools, broadly reflecting the geographical
location of the authors, Cohen has effectively canonised the field as
an Anglo-American discipline.1
In his latest book, Advanced introduction to international political
economy (2014), Cohen acknowledges that the field is ‘notoriously
diverse’, and includes alternative ideas of IPE both within and
outside the west. In this ‘pluralistic’ account of the discipline, he
presents the reader with new stories about the heterodox tradition in
the United States and the Marxism of continental Europe while
leaping across continents to China and Latin America to discover
their ‘traditions’ of thinking and doing IPE. But he does not do the
same for Africa – which, as our title suggests, is out in the proverbial
dark.
This omission repeats a well-worn trend that bears repeating here in
the foothills: writing about the ‘international’ invariably ignores
Africa. ‘Even in the most ambitious and ostensibly all-encompassing
narratives’ on the political economy of a globalising world, the
critical anthropologist James Ferguson (2006: 25) notes, a continent
that takes up 20 percent of the land mass of the world, one fourth of its
constituent states, and one seventh of its population remains
conspicuous by its absence. Unsurprisingly, in Ferguson’s opinion,
Africa is an ‘inconvenient continent’; it does not fit in the
deep-seated ‘scientistic’ impulse that modern knowledge systems
are compelled to use. The knowledge economy which underpins IPE
disaggregates regions in terms of their economic models; the western
‘liberal’ model versus the East Asian ‘developmental state’ model
versus the Latin American ‘dependencia’ school (Blyth 2009). But
when it comes to Africa, there is no ready model except of course the
‘coming anarchy’ image, which has persisted since the phrase was
first used by the polemicist Robert Kaplan (1994) more than two
decades ago. In other words, the imperialism of categories and the
resulting cartographies ironically mark Africa as an invisible space
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge, power and IPE
in southern Africa
1013
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
in the economy of knowledge production. As a result, in western
international relations (IR), Africa is primarily a consumer of
knowledge, and a willing recipient of these models.
Neither inconvenience nor invisibility, however, are Cohen’s
reasons for eliding Africa. Along with Russia, Japan and the Arab
world, Cohen does consider the possibility of finding IPE in Africa.
‘Certainly’, he says, ‘in many of these places, one or a few
individuals may be seen doing work that is recognisably IPE in
nature’ (2014: 10). He never tells us who these people are. Writing
from the southern tip of Africa, this smacks of the sloppy research
which Africans are all too frequently accused of – but, hey, let’s
remember the company, and call it ignorance. The dedicated work of
a generation of writers like Rob Davies, Dan O’Meara, Mike Morris,
Dave Kaplan and Duncan Innes are clear examples of IPE.
Moreover, a long underground tradition of resistance writing using
political economy as a point of entry is found in the work of Neville
Alexander, who, despite his recent passing, remains very influential.
In addition, Dot Keet, John Saul, Patrick Bond and Hein Marais have
critically interrogated the myriad lives of political economy in the
southern African region. This body of work does not restrict analysis
to state and market, but expands it to include important questions –
race, gender, labour and land – which are central to the southern
African political economy.2
Given the company we keep in this special edition of the journal, we
are not keen to pick a fight with Cohen, and will confine ourselves to
the last four words in the line quoted above, namely ‘recognisably
IPE in nature’. These provide a more neutral platform from which to
ponder the many silences in conversations about the international. It
begins with this question: who recognises the ‘recognisably IPE’?
Answering this should lead us to broader questions about how IPE’s
disciplinary content should be decided. However, just as we are
entertaining the possibility that these questions can be asked from
Peter Vale and Vineet Thakur
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inside the discipline, Cohen’s next three lines in the same paragraph
conclusively rob us of that right:
However … [those who write on IPE in Africa]
are not included here because their numbers
are simply too small to form a genuinely
discursive discourse coalition. Beyond the
Anglosphere, local versions of the field are
mostly at an earlier stage of development. In
many countries or regions, the formation of an
institutionalised network of scholars has
barely even begun (2014: 10).
This suggests that African versions will always be ‘local’. This
understanding of the discipline implies that there are no
epistemological battles to be fought, since the discipline itself
follows a kind of academic Darwinism, with the Anglosphere
representing the ‘international’, while all other understandings are
‘local’ variants ‘at an earlier stage of development’. Furthermore,
Cohen’s belief that a critical mass of scholarship in IPE has not
developed in Africa is strikingly at odds with his earlier version of
what IPE constitutes. In his Intellectual history (2008: 8), Cohen
placed the responsibility of stitching the discipline together on his
‘Magnificent Seven’, comprising the three Roberts (Keohane, Cox
and Gilpin); Susan Strange; Charles Kindleberger; Stephen Krasner;
and Peter Katzenstein – a small group in anybody’s book. Clearly, in
Cohen’s own analysis of the rise of IPE in the Anglosphere, the ideas
of seven individuals seem to represent a critical mass, but the seven
African writers (mentioned above) are not sufficient to generate even
a sub-branch.
In pointing to these inconsistencies, it is not our intent to mull over
what constitutes a critical mass of scholarship, nor indeed to serve up
an apologia for African or southern African IPE. We are well aware
that some of the work we have cited above may well be described as
derivatives of 1970s British IPE. But such a description would, in our
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge, power and IPE
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view, be spurious, because in no small sense all intellectual work is
derivative; to make the point differently, derivation makes
disciplines like IPE. Moreover, the politics of location and
authenticity in knowledge creation serves no useful purpose, since
much of the European knowledge of IR and IPE can be said to come
from non-western sources (Hobson 2004). Yet the vital thing is not
whether a particular work speaks of a certain intellectual tradition,
but whether it speaks of a certain human condition.
In our view, the work cited above speaks to the very life-blood of
southern Africa. Indeed, so strong is the lore of IPE in the region that,
for many, its very story cannot be told outside of the disciplinary
routines of IPE. Given this, IPE is not a local or provincial story that
can be hived off into a corner or bracketed within ‘alternative
traditions in IPE’; it is as important a narrative about the
‘international’ in southern Africa as the narratives from the
Anglosphere.
Africa is an independent and highly productive site for the
knowledge and practice of IPE, and evinces a robust tradition of
debate in the field (Amin 1976). In tracing the development of
political economy in a region of Africa, we propose to juxtapose the
development of political economy as an intellectual project and
political economy as a southern African reality. In doing this, we will
show how the knowledge of political economy has constructed (and
constricted) the political economy of the region. The introduction of
Africa into this conversation, through the use of southern Africa,
cannot therefore be seen as insertion of Africa as an alternative
model or tradition in IPE. By contrast, we argue that any intellectual
project of international political economy must constantly remain
alive to the relationship between knowledge and the power of its
production.
Peter Vale and Vineet Thakur
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Pre-history, political
economy and power
The founding year in the ‘life-cycle’ of IPE as an academic field,
according to Cohen (2008: 17), was 1970. Yet, the karmic cycle of
IPE, Cohen argues, begins in its prehistory when it was still called
‘political economy’ in Europe. Beginning with the works of the
British administrative reformer William Petty, who coined the term
‘Political Oeconomies’ in 1671, political economy emerged as a
discipline studying the economies of state. Locked in by what Karl
Polyani (1945) defined as the ‘double movement’, the state and the
market in Europe developed in close communion with each other. In
studying the development of these two social institutions together
and in relation to each other, the nascent discipline of IPE was able to
map the trajectory of their importance to society.
From the mid-1860s onwards, as Cohen tells us without furnishing
reasons, the discipline sub-divided into two distinct fields of study:
politics and economics. However, as the sociologist Randall Collins
(1994: 26-30) reminds us, it was not so much of a forking or a
sub-division as an appropriation of the idea of political economy by
the separate field of economics.
The battles over what constituted the field would be fought on a
wider ideological canvas, especially in Europe. An emphasis on
economics as the driving variable in political economy had begun
with Adam Smith in Britain (Thornton 2014: xi). By the second half
of the 19th century, the battle for hegemony between the laissez-faire
political economists and the mercantilists was finally settled in
favour of the former in Britain, the academic home of political
economy and some of the most famous political economists – Adam
Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus and John Stuart Mill. This
was called the Golden Age of British imperialism: it was
underpinned by a philosophy of economic control that was
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge, power and IPE
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considered more important than the philosophy which underpinned
political control. The business of the state was, in the words of Lord
Palmerston, ‘to open and secure the roads for the merchant’ (quoted
in Robinson, Gallaghar and Denny 1968: 4). Laissez-faire
economics was explicitly a British imperial project which was
elevated to a universalistic philosophy in which individual-centric
notions of the social were prioritised over community-centred ones.
The newly developed neo-classical or marginalist economics created
by William Levon, Francis Edgeworth and Alfred Marshall in
England pushed for a methodological leap that further exacerbated
the divide of economics from politics: their work turned economics
towards a technical and mathematical science. Principles of
Economics (which was also the name of Alfred Marshall’s book in
1890) secured economics as a separate academic discipline, and all
but silenced the principles of politics by elevating the economic to a
higher status.
The disciplinary predominance of economics was so strong that
university positions in England from the mid-1860s were open only
to pro-laissez faire academics (Collins 1994: 28). The knock-on
effect of this further damaged the study of politics; as a result,
discussions about the politics of the state were pushed towards law
departments, where the state qua state was deemed to be a
constitutional rather than a social actor (Wallerstein et al 1996: 19).
This restructuring of disciplinary categories fed directly into how the
political economy of distant places was shaped and reshaped in the
heart of colonialism.
Constructing the region
At the time when the rift between economics and politics sharpened,
first diamonds and then gold were discovered in southern Africa –
events that would change the region forever. The promotion of
industrial modernity, through mining, introduced two institutions of
Peter Vale and Vineet Thakur
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social organisation that had hitherto been largely absent from the
region’s politics: the state and the market. Until then, the region had
an agrarian political economy, and the forms of social organisation
ranged from manqué Westphalian-type states to British colonies to
fairly decentralised indigenous political formations. These were
marked by their instability and constant formation and re-formation
by migration, a tendency that was canonised through the historical
lore of ‘trekking’ (on this, see Etherington 2001). But, with the
coming of mining capital, social and political heterogeneity became
a prisoner to the conformity and disciplining that is essential to
modernity. However, even though replication is the essence of
modernity, its mimicry has invariably manifested itself in
bastardised forms in colonial settings. Expectedly, this mimicry in
southern Africa reflected its own idiosyncrasies.
The infusion of a modern economy in southern Africa was neither
natural, nor – unsurprisingly – did it generate an internal regional
market. Instead, the ambitions of capital were primarily focused on
the extractive sector for which the market was located in Europe. As
a result, there was no need to create an internal market, and the cost of
labour could be kept to a minimum. Consequently, the impact of
economic activity remained, in Ferguson’s helpful phrase (2006:
36), ‘socially thin’. Given that much of the labour would be
performed by Africans, the relations of production were structured
around the optic of race, rather than, as in Europe, class. The function
of any political authority, as a result, was primarily twofold: to
maintain racial distinction, and to drive Africans towards serving
mining capital. So, and this is not exceptional in the colonial setting,
the development and nature of political authority were fuelled by the
logic of profit.
The subordination of politics to economics was visible in all forms of
rule in the region. The region’s primus inter pares state, South
Africa, was a compromise among settler colonialists to secure
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge, power and IPE
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political power. This allowed British capital, with trickle-down for
their Afrikaner compatriots, to maintain their economic
accumulation while satiating the political aspirations of Afrikaner
nationalism. Centres of African power – dismissively called
‘territories’ – were either incorporated into South Africa, or retained
as British protectorates (their formal designation for half a century)
in the form of modern-day Lesotho and Swaziland. Still others,
Botswana and what is now Zimbabwe, were simply leased out to
capital and fell prey to the ambitions of imperial adventurers like
Cecil John Rhodes. This layered form of regional sovereignty was
compatible with the growing idea of economic maximalism that, in
the immediate setting, succeeded principally in destroying ‘the
reproduction of the capacity of independent reproduction of African
peoples in the region’ (Niemann 2001: 70).
The result was that sovereignty and statehood in southern Africa
were not only foundationally racist and exclusive; its distribution
was also made functional to the economic motive. The relationship
between politics and economics was underpinned by laissez faire
minimalism – the minimalist intervention of political authority, set
against the maximisation of profits in the imperial market.
Unsurprisingly, political authority routinised the practice of coercion
and extraversion in all markets, but particularly in labour. In the late
19th and early 20th centuries, whites in South Africa extracted a slew
of new taxes and tributes aimed at making agriculture unsustainable
in the territories, and creating a centrifugal displacement of Africans
into mining centres located on South Africa’s Witwatersrand. This
new form of migration was opposite to the mobility patterns that had
marked the region’s earlier life. The mid-19th century had witnessed
a diffused displacement of people and communities expanding
through migration: the Mfecane and the Great Trek are the exemplars
of this moment. But by the end of the 19th century, the direction had
changed: the pull was inwards where the migrant trails connected the
Peter Vale and Vineet Thakur
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region’s periphery to the mining centres, initially located in the city
which became Johannesburg, but later in an area ironically called
‘the Free State’. It was through this authorised – no, enforced –
centrifugal movement of men towards the machinery which aided
extraction that southern Africa as a spatial construct began to
emerge.
Let us pause to capture the points that have built this conceptual
platform. In the early 20th century, southern Africa had two major
features: first, it was a single economic region characterised by an
uneven race-based distribution of income, and the migration of
people. Second, the nature of the political authority in the region was
determined by its subservience to economics. Moreover, a decided
hierarchy of political authority followed the region’s economic
structure. In this, South Africa was ‘first among unequals’ (Vale
2003), and this unevenness in both wealth and power meant that the
South African state became the lever for controlling the regional
economy in quasi-imperial fashion.
This platform enables us to return to the intellectual history of IPE.
As we have pointed out, the disciplinary bifurcation in the 19th
century turned on the subversion of politics by economics. The
prevailing economic logic – especially laissez faire – became the
dominant political preoccupation towards which all forms of
authority, but especially state power, were meant to be directed.
Moreover, laissez faire economics became the dominant mode for
transforming societal relations throughout southern Africa. In the
academy, however, the study of politics – and of authority – were
restricted to questions of law and constitutions from which
effectively the base impulses of social relations were excluded. To
use a famous image from Foucault, the capillaries of power were
subverted by the legalistic notions that ordered social life; the form
that this ordering took was the state.
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge, power and IPE
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As we have already established, the colonial state in southern Africa
mimicked the European state. More often than not, it took its
sovereign form from the West, while its everyday dynamic was
rooted in the messy politics of the local. As Charles Tilly (1985) has
argued, the formation of the European state was underpinned by the
project of internal pacification. This was achieved by creation of a
domestic market, and an effective apparatus that secured the internal
from external threat. Although important, the domestic functions of
policing were subservient to the military function of preserving state
sovereignty. In sharp contrast, the colonial state in southern Africa
was formed to provide land and labour resources for a market that
existed externally. By serving external interests, the local state was
not the protector from, but the purveyor of, internal violence. Put
differently, if the European state aimed to make internal violence an
exception, the colonial state in southern Africa was about making
internal violence an everyday reality. This regime of control was
enforced through the uprooting of indigenous people, the mass
dislocation of people, the whips and sjamboks of forced labour, the
wars fought against Africans as well as the Boers, all of which was
subservient to the dream of Cecil John Rhodes of painting the map
between the Cape and Cairo in the imperial colour. The violence of
the state in southern Africa was couched in terms of the more
palatable political idea of liberalism, whose academic manifestation
was to be found in the London-based journal Round Table.
In writing off the everyday violence of political authority through
invocations of the ‘liberal spirit’ (Hoernlé 1939), and by deeming it
integral to the progressive spirit of imperialism, intellectual
authorisation of the separation of politics and economics fashioned a
peculiar political economy of colonialism (Marks and Trapido 1979;
Dubow 1997).3
For most of the 20th century, understandings of southern Africa and
its constituent states remained enmeshed with South Africa – the
Peter Vale and Vineet Thakur
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only ‘independent’ state in the region, the economic centre of its
political economy, and therefore its definitional centre.
Unsurprisingly, the terms ‘South’ and ‘southern’ were often used
interchangeably by Jan Smuts (1870-1950), South Africa’s most
important pre-apartheid politician. Even the nationalism of the
oppressed majority in South Africa remained ambivalent about what
separated the state for which they were fighting from the place
known as southern Africa. In part, this was because African
nationalism was, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, a ‘nationalism’
of economic migrants, as was so graphically evident in the Freedom
Charter of 1955.4 Nationalism that had tales of regional mobility at
the centre of its appeal could not easily reconcile with a nationalism
that championed the set boundaries of the state.5
Region, regimes and
rationality
According to Cohen, the establishment of IPE as an intellectual
project began around 1970 and its natal moment was the publication
of Susan Strange’s widely discussed article ‘International economics
and international relations: a case of mutual neglect’ (1970). In this,
she called for an end to the ‘dialogue of the deaf’ – a phrase which
Cohen repeats (2014: 5). In Cohen’s view, the article became a
manifesto for (re)integrating international economics and
international politics. The call itself had been prompted by a number
of developments in the international arena, namely the seeming end
both of the Bretton Woods system and American economic
hegemony, the success of the European integration project, the
ensuing détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and
the rise of new economic powers like Japan and Germany – to
mention but a few.
These changes challenged the state-centrism of realism and, as a way
of thinking that reacts to real world developments, IR was called
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge, power and IPE
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upon to respond. Scholars countered by arguing that, alongside the
state, the market was the other dominant reality in the world of the
international. So, while anarchy forced states to seek power, the
market forced them to seek profit. IR, in a famous formulation of the
time, was not only about the life and death issues of statecraft, but
also about the bread and butter issues of economics (Keohane and
Nye 1977). Given this move, and the intellectual ennui that attended
realism in the 1970s, states and markets had become the most
important disciplinary preoccupation.
Following the emphasis on the market, and the eagerness of IPE
scholars to temper their interest in the state, the European integration
project – especially with the admission of the United Kingdom – was
the focus of much enthusiasm. The theoretical evolution of David
Mitrany’s functionalism into Ernst Hass’s neo-functionalism,
inspired by what seemed like an emerging European ‘security
community’ (Deutsch et al 1957), encouraged theorists to look
beyond states as the only motors governing the idea of the
‘international’.
In southern Africa, where states had just begun to take shape,
something quite different was taking place: liberation from
colonialism had taken a decidedly national turn. Although arbitrarily
drawn up during the 1885 Berlin Conference, the importance of
Africa’s borders had been reasserted. Theory in the field once again
seemed to be at the other end of practice when it came to the ‘dark
continent’.
The independence of Ghana in 1957 set off a chain reaction across
sub-Saharan Africa, reaching southern Africa in 1961. In that year
Tanzania became the first state in the region after South Africa to
gain independence: Malawi, Zambia, and the three High
Commission Territories – Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland –
followed in quick succession. In 1965, the Rhodesian unilateral
Peter Vale and Vineet Thakur
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declaration of independence established another settler colonial state
like South Africa in the region. But it was increasingly clear that the
days of minority and colonial rule in the region were numbered. The
Lisbon Coup of April 1974 brought down the Portugal colonial
regimes in southern Africa, leading to the independence of Angola
and Mozambique a year later. Apartheid South Africa carried out its
own form of decolonisation by inserting a new category of fictive
‘independent’ states (culled from previously common territory) into
the regional lexicon in the late 1970s and 1980s. In all, southern
Africa witnessed multiple modernities of statehood, and the
relationship of each with its domestic, regional and international
sphere was different: one thing was clear, however, namely that
boundary-making in the name of politics was the central feature of
regional life.
If this regional matrix suggested anything, it was that conceptually –
if not quite politically – the region was up for grabs. Invariably, the
theoretical battles for cartographic black-boxing were driven by
specific ideological agendas. Dependencia scholars declared the
new states in the region only nominally independent and lacking any
sense of agency against the core state, South Africa (see Vale 1983).
Interestingly, critical models like these shared their analytical
conclusions, even if their moral persuasions were contrasting, with
those emanating from the other side of the Cold War divide.
Region as ideology
In 1968, relying on the tenuous economic and infrastructural
linkages of region, the young American scholar Larry W Bowman
argued that southern Africa was a ‘sub-ordinate state system’ that
operated ‘quite independently of the dominant world power blocs’
(Bowman 1968). Such a regional framing was consistent with the
positivist area-study model of post-World War Two social science
imagination, engineered to serve the epistemic needs of a resurgent
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge, power and IPE
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United States. While no one could deny that these linkages
connected a certain regional space to South Africa, Bowman’s
reasoning served a narrow political purpose. His thesis was based on
two central premises: the first, that South Africa was the economic
hegemon in the region; and the second, leading from the first, that the
political interaction among the constituent states in southern Africa
was increasing, despite objections to South Africa’s and Rhodesia’s
racist policies. In the neo-functional tenor fashionable at the time,
Bowman argued that the linkages in the region would lead to a
greater political understanding among the political actors in southern
Africa, notwithstanding the racist character of its hegemon.
Bowman’s idea became the foundational ground for the creation and
recreation of regional models that imagined South Africa ‘as the
focal point for the creation of a combination of regional states based
principally upon economic considerations’ (Grundy 1982: 153; also
see Vale 1983).
This imaginary was an assuring sign for an American
intellectual-military complex caught in the trap of Cold War
thinking. A region whose aspirations for independence claimed to be
inspired by communism could be controlled through its capitalist
(though racially offensive) core. The intellectual, economic, and
military capital of the west was invested in making this version of
southern Africa a reality.
In the early 1970s, the South African Institute of International
Affairs (SAIIA) – then the country’s premier foreign policy
think-tank – organised successive conferences on the seemingly
neutral issue of ‘development’ in southern Africa,6 funded by the
who’s who of South African capital, and the Boston-based
Foundation for Foreign Affairs (FFA). The latter was an American
think-tank which had been founded to advocate American isolation
and, with time, morphed into a conservative think-tank (Doenecke
1980/81). It also funded the journal Modern Age, described as the
Peter Vale and Vineet Thakur
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‘principal quarterly of the intellectual Right’ (Nash 1976: 145).
Conservative thinking at the time hinged its political capital on the W
W Rostow-inspired theory of modernisation (1960), which quickly
became the darling of American political science. Calling
modernisation ‘a special kind of hope’, the leading political scientist
David Apter famously pronounced that ‘the struggle to modernise is
what has given meaning to our generation’ (quoted in Worrall 1974:
113). The participants in the two successive Johannesburg
conferences were animated by the possibilities of such South
Africa-led modernisation in southern Africa.
Welding the region together in a singular and linear modernisation
narrative, the conferences sought to provide a model for southern
African development. While defining southern Africa ‘as a region
based to a large extent on economic ties between the various
countries, such as intra-regional trade and labour movements’, the
first conference, which focused on the theme of ‘Accelerated
Development’, identified the neo-functional model of spiralled up
integration as embodied in the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the most widely
accepted model for the region (Brand 1972: 674-675).
Drawing inspiration from this early thinking, a successive
generation of scholars and policy-makers advanced theories and
models that imagined southern Africa variously as a ‘co-prosperity
sphere’, a ‘common market’, and later a ‘constellation of states’
(reported in Grundy 1982: 153). None of these models were fully
fleshed out, but each stemmed from an understanding that South
African economic power was so preponderant in the region that other
regional actors would be compelled to join South Africa-centred
regional mechanisms (Geldenhuys 1981). Driven by apartheid South
Africa’s apprehension about the liberation aspirations of black
Africa, the underlying assumption for apartheid policy-makers was
that
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... the economic might of South Africa … can
be used to assure the necessary gradual or
evolutionary equality to a managed change,
and to defer and dissipate revolutionary verve
by a modulated distribution of the rewards of
economic growth. And because of South
Africa’s central role in the process,
trickle-down enriches South Africa, stabilises
the region, and rewards black leaders who play
ball (Grundy 1982: 157-158).
In short, regional integration became South Africa’s cure-all for its
domestic and regional woes. It was ‘constructed, enlarged and …
tenaciously defended because it enable[d] to enrich itself at the
expense of its regional neighbours’ (Grundy 1982: 159).
The elevation of this economic rationality to a principle of political
certainty was increasingly problematic for others in the region. This
quickly became clear when their apartheid-centered efforts at
regional integration, even under the eaves of modernisation theory,
were spurned by black Africa.
As we have argued above, there was no common story of the path to
statehood in southern Africa. As a result, all the states – whether
nominally independent or not – connected differently to the idea of
region. For instance, while the faux-independent states made by
apartheid had no agency when it came to decisions about regional
arrangements, other states in the region – like Zambia or Malawi –
could exercise greater discretion in deciding about their role in the
region even if they were, as the Mozambican president Samora
Michael remarked, ‘chained to the dungeons of apartheid’ (quoted in
Grundy 1982: 167). Independent Malawi, under the presidency of
the controversial Hastings Banda, aligned itself with the apartheid
state, while Zambia, under the redoubtable Kenneth Kaunda, was
drawn in the opposite direction. For Kaunda, the moral question of
human rights and majority rule in southern Africa were as important
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as economic ties – he would, of course, play a high price for this ideal.
In 1980, in a somewhat heroic effort, the fully independent states of
the region joined forces in a loose multilateral set of arrangements
which enjoyed the moniker ‘Frontline’ (Grundy 1982). Their idea
was to jointly protect their individual and collective sovereignty
from the war – increasingly known as regional destabilisation – that
the apartheid state was waging against them. By choosing to imagine
the region without its economic hegemon, this politics of resistance
gave voice to a non-racial, non-exploitative, and non-hegemonic
form of regionalism.
The other problem with the intellectual flattening of the region
through the modernisation discourse was that it completely
neglected the peculiar sociology of the state in southern Africa.
Migration, as Vale (2003) has argued elsewhere, has been the central
constitutive factor of state formation in southern Africa. Unlike the
West, where borders and boundaries sanitise the state and give it
security, the security of the state in southern Africa is fundamentally
tethered to patterns of migration; boundaries in southern Africa are
often more fictitious than real. Ironically, however, the more
apartheid South Africa tried to imagine the region in benign terms in
the 1960s and 1970s, the more oppressive its state machinery became
internally. The inversion of the security paradigm – where internal
becomes the external, and the external internal – was destined to
implode sooner than later. This was increasingly illustrated during
‘destabilisation’, when apartheid’s security forces ransacked the
region with an impunity only previously enjoyed by America in
Latin America.
Even in the midst of destabilisation, the economy through which
South Africa could cripple the region was sustained by migratory
regional labour. Consequently, neither political nor economic
models could comfortably address the paradox of the Westphalian
state in southern Africa. Furthermore, in what remains a testimony to
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the intellectual betrayal of alternative possibilities in southern
Africa, there were other, more fertile, people-centred rather than
sovereignty-defined, ideas of the region which were conveniently
sidelined by state or market-driven projects and the state-patrolled
security enjoyed by capital (for more on this, see Vale 2001:
135-160).
The regional models that emerged from the South African
mainstream academia had distilled critical societal narratives of race
from discussions on political economy. Following the introduction
of modernisation theory, the question of race in South Africa was
subsumed within the larger scheme of capitalist modernisation.
Chained to ideas of ethnic development, the various races were
considered to be climbing up the development ladder at their own
pace. The linear trajectory was fully developed in the idea of a
regional ‘constellation of states’, with white South Africa at the
centre, and black states forming the periphery. Understood in this
way, apartheid was not a racist but a benign modernisation project
that allowed each race to develop on its own, at its own speed. The
mainstream liberal critiques, while disagreeing with apartheid’s
understanding of race, also invested their faith in the power of
capital. Michael O’Dowd, a businessman and intellectual, advanced
a thesis along the lines of Rostow: capitalism and apartheid, he
argued, were essentially in opposition to each other, and the ‘free
market’ would erode the basis of apartheid. This view, promoted by
the formation of a think-tank called the Free Market Foundation, was
widely accepted in liberal circles (O’Dowd 1977). While critiquing
liberal ideas, a number of Marxist scholars (most of them in exile,
including Rob Davies, Dan O’Meara, Martin Legassick and Harold
Wolpe), argued that racial domination in South Africa was intrinsic
to the development of the capitalist economy (see Helliker and Vale
2013: 26). Their criticism was also partly directed at the
Soviet-inspired communism of the South African Communist Party
which, they held, emphasised race over class (Nash 1999).
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The 1970s saw the emergence of a new generation of young radicals
who drew their interpretation of Marxism from a wide range of
sources such as Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukacs, Frantz Fanon,
Amilcar Cabral and Julius Nyerere (Moss 2014). The ‘generation of
the 1970s’, as Andrew Nash (1999: 66) calls them, came out of a
vibrant student political and intellectual life within South Africa’s
universities.7 This encouraged a dialectical engagement between the
racial character and class character of the South African state which
was to include movements of all shades and questions – class, race,
gender and ethnicity: taken together, these came to frame an organic
critique of the capitalist character of the South African state. The
United Democratic Front, which emerged in the 1980s as a grass
roots movement, grew out of the marriage between this critical social
theory and emerging political practice (Helliker and Vale 2012:
335), and undermined the relationship between capital and the state
by exposing their divorce from the society as a whole.
What does this long journey tell us about the place of political
economy in southern Africa? While IPE pushed IR to look beyond
states in international relations, its intellectual ramifications in
southern Africa were manifested in South Africa’s efforts to create a
regional model based on economic rationality, and present itself as a
benign and legitimate hegemon. Theoretically, such analyses of
southern Africa were off the mark for two reasons. First, by placing
the dynamics of the market at the centre of analysis, IPE took the
focus away from the state. This was just at the moment when new
states were emerging in southern Africa, and the challenge for IR
scholarship was to explore ways to bring the state ‘back in’. Second,
while IPE took the focus away from states, it nevertheless agreed
with the state-as-black-box understanding of realism. But, in
southern Africa, as every IR scholar should know, the real choices of
states were informed by domestic social struggles around race.
Consequently, intellectual narratives became part of these social
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struggles. The dominant narrative of IPE was appropriated by a
South African mainstream intellectual class to advance a narrative of
regionalism that sought to perpetuate South African racial
hegemony. Here, we have also briefly noted the alternative
narratives of political economy that identified themselves with the
social struggles being fought against the apartheid state.
Futures past, past futures:
what do we make of IPE in
Southern Africa?
The end of apartheid momentarily lightened the gloom in southern
African skies. This said, the political transition following apartheid
was a historic moment when the region could be wrested, not just
from the securocrats of apartheid but also from the knowledgeocrats
who had colonised imaginations of regional political economy. But
the promise of a bright new future soon degenerated into a re-run of
the region’s unhappy past (Vale 2003). The security paradigm within
which the political economy of the region had been constructed
during the apartheid years found new ‘others’ to resurrect old
discourses, as racial tropes were replaced by ones centred on the
nation – especially on the idea of South Africa’s exceptionalism. The
old economy of the racial division of labour was replaced by a new
economy of a nationality-driven division of labour in which
citizenship and subjecthood were determined by the passport, rather
than the colour of skin. This complaint may sound unreasonable in
the stable national spaces of Europe, but in southern Africa, where
migration is central to the very constitution of both regional and
national spaces, such practices help to sustain old exclusionary
trends.
Incapable of making any imaginative leaps, the political economists
in the South African think-tank industry, such as those at SAIIA
(founded in 1934) and the Brenthurst Foundation (established in
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2004), took up the task of serving the old wine in a new bottle.
Concerns for new forms of theoretical thinking about political power
and its relationship with economics had been declared wasteful in the
‘new world order’. After all, in the post-Cold War world, we had all
been declared ‘liberals’, permanently disempowered from
registering any contrapuntal notes. All forms of critique located
outside of the liberal paradigm were irrelevant and, following
Fukuyama’s famous 1989 dictum about history, ‘dead’. In South
Africa’s academia, this provoked two kinds of shifts and divisions.
First, political economy was distanced from social theory, and pulled
directly into public policy. The end of apartheid had coincided with
the Washington Consensus and the unofficial proclamations of ‘it’s
the economy, stupid!’ With unbridled neo-liberalism becoming the
political mantra of the 1990s, the spaces for discussions about
different economic trajectories were pulled under by the weight and
urgency of the notion that ‘public policy’ could solve all ills. Second,
the foreign-funded think-tank industry produced ‘policy papers’
consistent with neo-liberal principles that were readily absorbed by a
government increasingly obsessed with the imperative of
transformation. The theory-inclined academia, in contrast, could
only produce pieces that were rich in argument but thin in policy.
Consequently, the discursive power of think-tanks to mould policies
and practices far outweighed that on offer by the universities who
were themselves under pressure to transform. Within the
universities, the study of political economy – once a thriving industry
– was eroded by the search for relevance. This double dislocation of
political economy resulted in an obliteration of a once vibrant
intellectual project.
Undeniably, political economy as an idea in southern Africa persists
in critical corners. Scholars from university-based institutes in South
Africa such as the International Labour Research and Information
Group (ILRIG), the Society, Work and Development Institute
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(SWOP) and the Centre for Civil Society (CCS) continue to critique
mainstream political economy thinking in the country and the region.
Elsewhere in the region, alternative conceptions of political
economy are kept alive by through institutions such as the Africa
Institute for Agrarian Studies in Zimbabwe. Ironically, though, the
notion seems to enjoy a more vibrant life amongst market-centred
intellectuals who continue to champion the idea that South Africa is
exceptional, and that it should continue to dominate the region. In a
brazen form both of political ambition and intellectual hegemony,
these claims are largely made by business intellectuals located in the
right-wing think-tank community (Vale and Carter 2008).
To end, we must return to the beginning, in order to make two vital
points. First, disciplines live and breathe outside of the words that
inscribe them; as a result, intellectual histories that remain confined
to unearthing a documentary trail must necessarily fall short.
Second, we must remain alive to the cartographic circumcision of
disciplines. The burden is not on the political economy in ‘Russia,
Japan, the Arab world or Africa’ to find its narrators: the search for
knowledge – let alone truth – operates the other way around. If we
begin with the assumption that IPE is absent from vast spaces on the
globe, we may as well stop calling it ‘international’. Benjamin
Cohen’s efforts at writing a history of the discipline must be
applauded. But our enthusiasm must be tempered with the certain
knowledge that his account is only one in the multiverse of IPE.
Notes
1. Some of these criticisms are summarised in Cohen (2014). For others, see
Shields et al (2011).
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2. For an illustrative sample of these writings, see Davies et al (1976), Davies
(1979), O’Meara (1983), Innes (1984), Alexander (2013), Keet (2006), Saul
(2001), Bond (1999) and Marais (2011). For feminist writings on political
economy, See Tsitaka and Amanor-Wilks (2009).
3. A group of Imperial devotees, derisively named ‘Milner’s Kindergarten’,
by the brilliant-but-eccentric lawyer and politician William Marriot, was in the
forefront of providing the intellectual support to fashioning a state and its
peculiar political economy in southern Africa. For some of the writings of this
group and its associates in South Africa, see Fortnightly Club Papers
(1906-1908) and The State (1909-1912).
4. The Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955, encapsulated an alternative vision
of society in apartheid South Africa. The result of wide public participation, it
became the magna carta of the struggle for a non-racial democracy in South
Africa.
5. See for instance, the writings of the Africanist nationalist intellectual Anton
Lembede (1996).
6. The two conferences, entitled ‘Accelerated Development in Southern
Africa’ and ‘Strategy for Development’, were organised in 1972 and 1974.
7. Student organisations such as the National Union of South African Students
(NUSAS) and the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) brought to the
fore a group of young radicals in the 1970s. Glen Moss (2014) names, among
others, Steve Biko, Neville Curtis, Eddie Webster, Steven Friedman and
himself as part of this new wave.
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Abstract
‘Out in the dark’: knowledge,
power and IPE in Southern Africa
Benjamin Cohen’s disciplinary history of international political economy
(IPE) begins with the premise that Africa has had little to contribute to this
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global discipline. Differing from this view, we argue that disciplinary
histories such as Cohen’s elide the relationship between the discipline and
its field. It is only through the juxtaposition of knowledge, power and
politics that we can arrive at a fuller historical understanding of the
international political economy. We further argue that political economy
as an intellectual project has been central to the creation of the political
economy of southern Africa. In a historical narrative of this idea in this
region, we demonstrate that states and markets have remained prisoners of
their mainstream intellectual manifestations, although subversive lives of
political economy persist in some critical corners.
Keywords: International Political Economy – Southern Africa –
Intellectual History – Regimes – Ideology
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